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Abstract                                                                                                                                         
 
At the beginning of W. G. Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn, the narrator sets off to walk the county of 
Suffolk to try and shake off the sense of emptiness he experiences whenever he finishes a long piece of 
work. However, far from effecting the kind of reconnection associated with the Thoreauvian saunterer or 
the walkers of narrative scholarship, this journey leaves him prey to a “paralysing horror” which assails 
him “when confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching far back into the past, that were evident 
even in that remote place”. Nowhere are these ‘traces of destruction’ more apparent than on the almost-
island of Orford Ness, where the post-apocalyptic landscape and the contraptions of the abandoned 
military base induce in him the fantasy that he is present long after the extinction of our civilization.  
This essay explores the dissonant affective implications of these all-too-human traces of 
destruction, drawing on concepts such as ‘thing-power’ (Bennett), ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze and Guattari), 
and the generative interplay of ‘actants’ (Latour), suggesting that while the material turn in ecocriticism 
has contributed valuable theoretical tools to the posthumanist project of decentring the human, its 
emphasis on our material imbrication in the life of the planet, with its myriad agencies and forms of 
signification, has at times deflected attention too far from the specificity of the human and the ongoing 
impact of our unique forms of ‘technicity,’ both on the landscape and on our own consciousness. It 
suggests the need for a tentative ongoing humanism within the posthumanist project, albeit from a 
decentred and position of reduced authority, that focuses on the unrelenting interrogation of the 
specificities of the human animal. 
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Resumen 
 
Al comienzo de The Rings of Saturn de W. G. Sebald, el narrador emprende un viaje por el condado 
de Suffolk para intentar librarse del sentido de vacío que experimenta siempre que termina un trabajo 
extenso. Sin embargo, lejos de tener el efecto de reconexión que se asocia con el caminante de Thoreau o 
los caminantes de la narrativa académica, este viaje le convierte en presa de un “horror paralizante” que le 
asalta “cuando se enfrenta a los rastros de la destrucción, volviendo atrás al pasado, que eran evidentes 
incluso en ese lugar remoto.” En ningún lugar son estos ‘rastros de destrucción’ más obvios que en la casi-
isla de Orford Ness, donde el paisaje post-apocalíptico y los artilugios de la base militar abandonada le 
inducen la fantasía de que él está presente mucho después de la extinción de nuestra civilización. 
Este ensayo explora las implicaciones afectivas disonantes de estos rastros de destrucción 
excesivamente humanos, valiéndose de conceptos como ‘poder-cosa’ (Bennett), ‘artilugios’ (Deleuze y 
Guattari) y la interacción generativa de ‘actantes’ (Latour), sugiriendo que mientras que el giro material 
en ecocrítica ha proporcionado al proyecto posthumanistas herramientas teóricas valiosas para 
descentrar al ser humano, su énfasis en nuestra imbricación material en la vida del planeta, con sus 
innumerables agencialidades y formas de significado, a veces ha desviado la atención demasiado lejos de 
la especificidad del ser humano y el continuo impacto de nuestras formas únicas de ‘tecnicidad,’ tanto en 
el paisaje como en nuestra propia consciencia. Sugiere la necesidad de un provisional humanismo 
continuo dentro del proyecto posthumanista, aunque desde una posición descentrada y de autoridad 
reducida, que se centre en la constante cuestión de las especificidades del animal humano. 
 
Palabras clave: crítica literaria, literatura inglesa, literatura europea, estudios culturales. 
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Prelude 
 
You are a human animal, 
You are a very special breed, 
For you are the only animal 
Who can think, who can reason, who can read. 
 
The cow goes moo, and the dog goes ruff,  
The cat meows, the horse kicks up his hoofs, 
And so the only human animal is you, you, you.  
(Jimmie Dodd, “You [Are a Human Animal]”)1 
 
These lyrics, sung by the Disney character Jiminy Cricket, originally featured in a 
1955 Mickey Mouse Club animation. I first came across the song in a seemingly quite 
incongruous context; it was until recently used as the theme music for Michael 
Silverblatt’s American radio show “Bookworm,” a programme which explores a range of 
literature via interviews with the writers, and I heard it when I listened to an archived 
recording of Silverblatt’s 2001 interview with the German-born author W.G. Sebald. My 
first reaction was one of ironic amusement—I was at the time in the midst of reading 
works of posthumanist philosophy, and this seemed a dated and comical example of 
humanist boosterism. I assumed that the song must have been chosen for the show in an 
ironic and knowing spirit—because of its obvious reference to reading but possibly also, 
more subtly, because of the questions it begged in its apparent vaunting of the qualities 
which raise us humans above the other animals that inhabit this planet. Later, having 
researched the song a little further, and having encountered web–based discussion 
criticising the lyrics for their suggestion that humans are animals rather than “men and 
women made in God’s image” (Adask n.p.), I began to feel that the song, even such as it 
is, may have unexpectedly radical potential in its naming of the human animal, both 
historically and in the ongoing creationist wranglings of the 21st century. I also began to 
feel that it might have a point—that there might be some value in continuing to explore 
the human animal, if not as a ‘special’ then at least as a specific breed. I realised, as I 
listened to the interview with Sebald, how the song might in that sense be an apt choice 
when it came to discussion of his work, given what an intensely humane thinker he was, 
how preoccupied with conscience, memory, ethics, and affect, and how willing to engage 
with the specificities of the human animal, not from a vantage point high up in the Great 
Chain of Being but from a deep reservoir of abjection and guilt.  
This essay is divided into two sections. In the first I explore aspects of the 
‘material turn’ in contemporary thought, discussing its incorporation into posthumanist 
ecological perspectives, its theorisation within the emergent field of material 
ecocriticism, and its implications for the development of new ethical positions. The 
insights of these ‘new materialisms’ have undoubtedly provided both posthumanism 
                                                     
1 “You (Are A Human Animal).” From Walt Disney's The Mickey Mouse Club. Words and Music by Jimmie 
Dodd (c) 1955 Walt Disney Music Company. Copyright Renewed. All Rights Reserved. Used by Permission. 
Reprinted by Permission of Hal Leonard Corporation. 
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and ecocriticism with invaluable tools for decentring the ‘human’ and disrupting 
anthropocentric world views. However, while material ecocriticism has fruitfully 
engaged with the notion of material interrelatedness and its effects on bodies and 
environments, and begun to explore the ethical implications of such entanglements, I 
would suggest that it has, as yet, been less forthcoming on the subject of affect—that 
dimension of bodily immersion that involves the interplay between the senses and 
registers of emotional experience. This is perhaps because, in its association with 
complex and contested concepts such as consciousness, subjectivity, conscience and 
memory, an exploration of affect might be seen as bringing attention back to the human 
self in a manner that sits uneasily with the broadly posthumanist remit of material 
ecocriticism. And yet one of the ways in which the vitality of matter manifests itself is in 
the powerful affective reverberations and resonances it co-creates in the human mind, 
and to step back from an investigation of the kind of subjectivities and interiorities 
which may come into play when considering affect both limits a full investigation of vital 
materiality and misses the opportunity to explore the potential of affective states for 
generating ethical development. Drawing on recent formulations of ‘affect theory’ that 
characterise affect as operating in the context of material immersion and involved in 
ongoing processes of becoming, as well as being potentially instrumental in the 
recalibration of ethical positions, I contend that there are some significant parallels with 
new materialist perspectives, and argue for the further ecocritical exploration of what 
we might call material affect.  
In the second part of the essay I explore the applicability of a material ecocritical 
reading to a short passage from W.G. Sebald’s 1995 work The Rings of Saturn in which 
the narrator-figure describes his experience of a visit to the almost-island of Orford 
Ness, the site of a now defunct military weapons-testing base. In highlighting the 
significance of Sebald’s evocation of the darkly disturbing, vitally affective power of the 
landscape’s collection of “scrap metal and defunct machinery” (237), which triggers a 
response in the narrator-figure that is, though unstated, integrally bound up with 
aspects of memory, conscience, and, ultimately, ethics,  I argue for the need for an 
ongoing humanism within ecocriticism that incorporates an understanding of our 
immersion in and dependence upon the nonhuman world (a model Serenella Iovino 
proposes in her essay “Material Ecocriticism: Matter, Text, and Posthuman Ethics”), but 
also reserves a place for the continuing and specific investigation of the human animal 
and its affective sensorium.  Following Elspeth Probyn’s lead, I also suggest that the 
literary exploration and articulation of affect might “generate new ways of thinking 
about how we are related to history and how we wish to live in the present” (Probyn 
89), in other words, might contribute to the development of the new ethical positions 
called for by the new materialisms and material ecocriticism. 
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Part I: The New Materialisms, Ecological Posthumanism, Material Ecocriticism, 
Affect Theory 
 
The material turn in areas such as feminist science studies, politics, and 
philosophy has inspired significant developments in the field of ecocriticism. The new 
materialisms emerging from these disciplines emphasise the shared materiality of the 
human and the nonhuman: “We live our everyday lives surrounded by, immersed in, 
matter. We are ourselves composed of matter” (Coole and Frost 1). They also 
foreground the agentic potential of all matter—its inherent “thing-power” (Bennett, 
Vibrant Matter 4)—which enables it to “make things happen, to produce effects” (5) as it 
participates in “intra-actions” (Barad 28) and “choreographies of becoming” (Coole and 
Frost 10). Within this framework, nature and culture are seen as “co-dependent and co-
evolving,” (Wheeler 41) inextricably combined as “naturecultures” (Haraway 1) that 
reveal the entanglement of areas previously deemed separate such as the biological and 
the social, the natural and the political. Diverse phenomena combine in “assemblages” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 4), groupings that “force us to abandon the subject-object 
dichotomy” (Latour 180) since all of the component parts, both human and nonhuman—
the “actants” (180)—“are in the process of exchanging competencies, offering one 
another new goals, new possibilities, new functions” (182)  
In this sense of the human as materially immersed in a world replete with 
nonhuman agencies and potentialities, the new materialisms have contributed to the 
posthumanist project of decentring the ‘human’. They have also added impetus to 
specifically ecological perspectives. The revelation of the agentic potential of all matter 
not only disrupts our sense of the autonomous human subject but also disturbs “the 
corollary presumption that humans have the right or ability to master nature” (Coole 
and Frost 10), as well as bringing sharply to our attention the folly of continuing to 
adhere to binary human/nature distinctions. Stacy Alaimo, pursuing “a new materialist 
and posthumanist sense of the human as substantially and perpetually interconnected 
with the flows of substances and the agencies of environments,” (“States of Suspension” 
476) has developed the concepts of “trans-corporeality” (“Trans-corporeal” 238) and 
“deviant agencies,” (Bodily Natures 139) to articulate the way in which matter—
sometimes highly toxic matter—crosses indiscriminately into environments and bodies.  
The incorporation of these perspectives into the emergent field of material 
ecocriticism has similarly foregrounded the importance of the new materialisms to 
posthumanist and ecological perspectives. Serenalla Iovino takes up Karen Barad’s 
notion of “posthumanist performativity,” (Barad 801) describing this as an effect 
whereby ‘posthuman’ “replaces the human/nonhuman dualism and overcomes it in a 
more dialectic and complex dimension” (Iovino, “Stories” 459). In this posthuman 
performativity the agentic contributions of the human and the nonhuman cannot be 
distinguished from each other, thus limiting our hubristic sense that we are in some way 
controlling the course of events. Serpil Oppermann, drawing parallels between the new 
materialisms and postmodern perspectives, also hints at their potential for providing 
“conceptual and practical tools of emancipation from anthropocentric thought” (36). 
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Taken as a whole, the contemporary material turn has given us, as Iovino argues, the 
opportunity to develop an “ecological horizontalism and an extended moral 
imagination” (“Material Ecocriticism” 52).  
The mention of a ‘moral imagination’ here suggests that the insights of the new 
materialisms might enable the development of new ethical positions. Jane Bennett hopes 
that the “onto-story” of matter and the “monism of vibrant bodies” (Vibrant Matter 3, 
121) “will enhance receptivity to the impersonal life that surrounds and infuses us, will 
generate a more subtle awareness of the complicated web of dissonant connections 
between bodies, and will enable wiser interventions into that ecology” (4), and Alaimo 
suggests that  
Emphasizing the material interconnections of human corporeality with the more-than-
human world, […] allows us to forge ethical and political positions that can contend with 
numerous late-twentieth-century/early-twenty-first-century realities in which “human” 
and “environment” can by no means be considered as separate. (“Trans-corporeal” 238) 
 
Likewise, Iovino argues that the ecological horizontalism she invokes might encourage 
the development of a “material ethics” (“Material Ecocriticism” 64) based on the “co-
extensive materiality” (64) of human and nonhuman. Recognising a possible tension 
between the notion of human ethics and the posthumanist drive to dismantle the human 
subject, Iovino posits the necessity for an ongoing “welcoming humanism” (66) within 
posthumanism—one that implies “agential kinships” (66) and “moral horizontality” 
(64), and involves both an understanding of “the inescapable role of the nonhuman in 
the making of the human, but also the impossibility of being, acting, and thinking in 
isolation from the nonhuman” (66).  
As already noted, however, notwithstanding this ongoing strand of humanism 
and its calls for ethical recalibrations, the focus of material ecocriticism on nonhuman 
agency combined with its broadly posthumanist leanings, has perhaps circumscribed 
the amount of attention as yet devoted to exploring the implications of the affective 
dimension of our receptivity to the impersonal life that surrounds us. While Bennett 
puts forward the notion of ‘enchantment’ as a catalyst for both ethical aspiration and 
enactment in her 2001 work The Enchantment of Modern Life, writing of the need for, 
among other factors which influence the formation of ethics, “a distinctive assemblage of 
affective propulsions” (3), in the more recent Vibrant Matter: a political ecology of things, 
she turns her focus from the ‘alter-tale’ of enchantment to the ‘onto-tale’ of matter. And 
although she identifies a possible “performative contradiction” (Vibrant Matter 120) in 
vital materialism in its reluctance to engage with the human subject—“Is it not, after all, 
a self-conscious, language-wielding human who is articulating this philosophy of vibrant 
matter?” (120)—for her, any attempt to interrogate the human in terms of its specificity 
leads back to hierarchy, and so she resists going any further in that direction. Instead 
she suggests that we try to elide the question of the human: 
Postpone for a while the topics of subjectivity or the nature of human interiority, or the 
question of what really distinguishes the human from the animal, plant and thing. Sooner 
or later, these topics will lead down the anthropocentric garden path, will insinuate a 
hierarchy of subjects over objects, and obstruct freethinking about what agency really 
entails.” (120) 
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But one of the central insights of the new materialisms is the conviction that everything 
in the cosmos is material, including those phenomena such as human subjectivity that 
we might have previously considered—at least from a Cartesian dualist perspective—as 
‘immaterial’ and thus separate from and transcending the world of matter. Coole and 
Frost’s ‘choreographies of becoming,’ involve a material continuum of  
objects forming and emerging within relational fields, bodies composing their natural 
environments in ways which are corporeally meaningful for them, and subjectivities 
being constituted as open series of capacities or potencies that emerge hazardously and 
ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes (10) 
 
and they state definitively that “In this monolithic but multiply-tiered ontology there is 
no definitive break between sentient and non-sentient entities or between material and 
spiritual phenomena” (10). While they are not explicit at this point about what 
constitute ‘spiritual phenomena’, earlier in their introduction to New Materialisms they 
discuss the way in which materialists have contested the supposed ‘immateriality’ (and 
also the privileging over matter) of phenomena such as “language, consciousness, 
subjectivity, agency, mind, soul; also imagination, emotions, value, meaning and so on” 
(2), suggesting that these may be some of the ‘spiritual’ phenomena they have in mind.  
Of course these phenomena are not unique to the human. Coole and Frost not 
only stress the multiplicity of nonhuman agencies, but also emphasise a plurality of 
‘subjectivities’. In fact, a key insight of at least one strand of the new materialisms is the 
immanence throughout the nonhuman world of phenomena such as signification, 
meaning and even ‘mind’. The ecophenomenologist David Abram sees human language 
as a response to an earth replete with its own forms of speech, arguing that “Mind is a 
luminous quality of the earth” (Becoming Animal 132) in “a terrain filled with 
imagination” (270). Iovino also draws on these perceptions in her articulation of 
material ecocriticism, identifying Abram with an area of new materialist thought which 
stresses “the concrete links between life and language, mind and sensorial perception” 
and encourages a sense of “kinship between out-side and in-side, the mind and the 
world” (“Material Ecocriticism” 55). In the predominance of the idea of kinship in this 
model, it might be seen as manifesting something of a deep ecological response to the 
notion of material entanglement, highlighting as it does the potential for a profound and 
rewarding sense of human imbrication in the life of the planet.  
However, as Iovino also readily acknowledges, the notion of shared materiality 
involves more problematic elements—for example, the ontological and epistemological 
challenges implied by complex naturalcultural intertwinings such as “electric grids, 
polluting substances, chemicals, energy, assemblages, scientific apparatuses, cyborgs, 
waste […]” (“Material Ecocriticism” 52)—elements that might combine with human 
subjectivities to create more dissonant affective states that militate against a sense of 
kinship. Jane Bennett herself makes it clear that the vital materiality she proposes is not 
one of harmonious interrelationship: “in contrast to some versions of deep ecology, my 
monism posits neither a smooth harmony of parts nor a diversity unified by a common 
spirit” (Vibrant Matter ix). She evokes a complicated range of phenomena in her 
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delineation of ‘thing-power’, when she describes a collection of objects she encounters 
one morning in a Baltimore storm-drain that includes a dead rat, a plastic glove, a plastic 
bottle cap, and a stick of wood. She stresses the way in which these things “commanded 
attention in [their] own right, as existents in excess of their association with human 
meanings, habit or projects” (4) and though she begins to address the affective power of 
the assemblage—“It issued a call, even if I did not quite understand what it was saying. 
At the very least, it provoked affects in me: I was repelled by the dead (or was it merely 
sleeping?) rat and dismayed by the litter” (4)—she resists privileging her subjective 
response over the vibrancy of the objects, ultimately reading this response as itself a 
form of thing-power: 
Was the thing-power of the debris I encountered but a function of the subjective and 
intersubjective connotations, memories, and affects that had accumulated around my 
ideas of these items? Was the real agent of my temporary immobilisation on the street 
that day humanity, that is, the cultural meanings of ‘rat,’ ‘plastic,’ and ‘wood’ in 
conjunction with my own idiosyncratic biography? It could be. But what if the swarming 
activity inside my head was itself an instance of the vital materiality that also constituted 
the trash? (10) 
 
Having come to this insight—which reveals the materiality of affect—Bennett then 
renews her attention to the ongoing material effects of things rather than pursuing the 
full reverberations of the vital, swarming affective activity, including  those feelings of 
repulsion and dismay, inside her head. Similarly, she uses Robert Sullivan’s powerful 
description of toxic pollutants combining in a New Jersey garbage heap to exemplify the 
ways in which “a vital materiality can never be thrown ‘away,’ for it continues its 
activities even as a discarded or unwanted commodity” (6). The passage quoted from 
Sullivan ends:  
this little seep was pure pollution, a pristine stew of oil and grease, of cyanide and 
arsenic, of cadmium, chromium, copper, lead, nickel, silver, mercury, and zinc. I touched 
this fluid — my fingertip was a bluish caramel colour — and it was warm and fresh. A few 
yards away, where the stream collected into a benzene-scented pool, a mallard swam 
alone.” (qtd. in Bennett, Vibrant Matter 6) 
 
We have a clear sense here of the continuing activities of the chemical pollutants 
as they combine into a toxic stew. But what might it mean to consider the affective 
agency of the scene for the human who forms part of the assemblage, or indeed for the 
reader of the text itself? Bennett may displace, as Iovino notes, “the focus of agency from 
the human to the ‘force of things’” (“Material Ecocriticism” 55) but an integral part of 
that force of things is its impact on what Coole and Frost call ‘spiritual phenomena,’ 
which include those manifested by the human animal. The sensations (and the 
description of them) that tell us that the stew of pollutants is warm and fresh and that 
the pool smells of benzene and is populated by a lone bird surely also carry with them 
further affective resonances including fear; possibly revulsion; perhaps a sense of guilt 
and responsibility at the pollution of the pool and the danger posed to the mallard—and 
these resonances may propel us to make ethical adjustments just as much as the 
conscious knowledge that the pollutants contained in the detritus of human 
consumerism are agents that have the power to recombine and develop new 
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potentialities. As we have seen, though, the idea of focusing attention on the human 
sensorium raises the spectres of anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism and can 
be seen as undermining the posthumanist project. Bennett asks: “Why are we so keen to 
distinguish the human self from the field?” (Vibrant Matter 121), fearing that the quest 
may be motivated by the demand “that humans, above all other things on earth, possess 
souls that make us eligible for eternal salvation?” (121). 
But what if the quest has a quite different motivation—one arising not from a 
desire to exalt the human subject as a uniquely autonomous privileged self, destined for 
transcendental salvation, but from a belief in the need to continue to investigate the 
flawed and complex human animal in all its dimensions? This is a question which has 
already been raised in recent ecocritical literature. Timothy Morton, for example, in The 
Ecological Thought, cites Levinas in his observation that “Posthumanism seems 
suspiciously keen to delete the paradigm of humanness like a bad draft; yet ‘Humanism 
has to be denounced only because it is not sufficiently human’” (113). He suggests that 
there are gaps in “posthuman ideological barriers” (113) that ecological thinking might 
need to slip through. It is perhaps one of these gaps that John Parham identifies when he 
suggests that, given that one of the insights of posthumanism is the recognition of “the 
fundamental difference between, and integrity of each and every species,” (146) in 
avoiding the question of “how we think about retaining expressly humanist perspectives 
and interests,” posthumanism “surely neglects the logic of its own position” (147). 
Similarly, material ecocriticism might risk neglecting the logic of its own position if it 
resists exploring the affective dimension of material embodiment, particularly its more 
dissonant aspects, even if that entails something of a re-engagement with the ‘human’. 
Responding to Jane Bennett’s work, Iovino writes; “If embodiment is the site where 
‘vibrant matter’ performs its narratives, and if human embodiment is a problematic 
entanglement of agencies, the body is a privileged subject for material ecocriticism” (58-
59). But the body is also the site of the narratives of affect—the entanglements of sense 
and feeling which occur as vital matter continues to swarm and reconfigure itself. In an 
ontology in which there is no definitive break between the material and the spiritual, the 
subjectivities “that emerge hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic 
and social processes” (Coole and Frost 10), including those of the human, are surely a 
site of interest. 
In fact, recent conceptualisations of affect resonate with aspects of the new 
materialisms and suggest that the study of matter and affect may share a good deal of 
common ground. While Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth note, that “There is no 
single, generalizable theory of affect” (3), in their introduction to The Affect Theory 
Reader they offer some broad definitions that characterise affect as intrinsically related 
to materiality and embodiment. Affect is “found in those intensities that pass body to 
body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate 
about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds” (1). And, chiming with Coole 
and Frost’s ‘choreographies of becoming’ and their account of an ontology in which 
there is no definitive break between material and spiritual phenomena, Gregg and 
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Seigworth’s affective process bridges sensation and sensibility, and can be understood 
as: 
A gradient of bodily capacity—a supple incrementalism of ever-modulating force-
relations—that rises and falls not only along various rhythms and modalities of 
encounter but also through the troughs and sieves of sensation and sensibility, an 
incrementalism that coincides with belonging to comportments of matter of virtually any 
and every sort. (2) 
 
This sense of incrementalism also implies that affective forces, like the actants Latour 
describes, are always involved in “exchanging competencies, offering one another new 
goals, new possibilities, new functions” (Latour 182), and that their ‘becoming’ cannot 
be contained or limited. Thus Gregg and Seigworth comment: “Perhaps one of the surest 
things that can be said of both affect and its theorization is that they will exceed, always 
exceed the context of their emergence, as the excess of ongoing process” (5).  The idea of 
affect as bodily, contingent, and incremental allows for a sense of human subjectivity as 
unstable, fluid, and co-constituted by the nonhuman—a perception that may avoid 
leading us, as Bennett fears, “down the anthropocentric garden path” (Vibrant Matter 
120) in our exploration of it, and thus sit more easily with posthumanist interests. At the 
same time, though, the study of affect does seem to involve discussion of specifically 
human subjectivities and perspectives. Gregg and Seigworth draw attention to its role in 
driving the human towards movement and thought (or conversely suspending that 
movement and thought), as the repetition of the pronoun ‘us’ and the 
anthropomorphising of affect in the following passage demonstrates:  
Affect, at its most anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces—visceral forces 
beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond 
emotion—that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that 
can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force 
relations, or that can leave us overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability. (1; 
emphasis original) 
 
The notion that we might be overwhelmed by the world’s apparent ‘intractability’ also 
hints at a break in human kinship with the non-human world—producing a sense in 
which we are both affectively imbricated but also ‘other’. It signals that there may be a 
basis for an ongoing strand of humanism within affect theory. Nigel Thrift, in his 2007 
work Non-Representational Theory: Space / politics / affect, allies himself with theories 
of affect that move away from the notion of the human subject, but also confesses: “All of 
that said, I do wish to retain a certain minimal humanism. Whilst refusing to grant 
reflexive consciousness and its pretensions to invariance the privilege of occupying the 
centre of the stage, dropping the human subject entirely seems to me to be a step too 
far” (13). Allowing some room for discussion of the human subject, albeit one removed 
from centre stage, also perhaps opens up the possibility of exploring the potential for 
affect to generate human ethical aspirations. In her essay “Writing Shame” which 
discusses the work of T.E. Lawrence and Primo Levi,  Elspeth Probyn, while emphasising 
the bodily impact of affective states, also suggests that “ideas and writing about shame 
seek to generate new ways of thinking about how we are related to history and how we 
wish to live in the present” (89).  
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I turn now to the work of W.G. Sebald and to a reading of his account of a visit to 
the abandoned military base at Orford Ness, which forms a short section of The Rings of 
Saturn. I suggest that a material ecocritical approach to the passage that stops short of 
an exploration of Sebald’s subtle articulation of the affective impact of the 
naturalcultural assemblage in which the narrator-figure finds himself misses the 
opportunity to consider the ways in which affective states might encourage us to think 
about history and how we wish to live now. I hope to show that Sebald’s description of 
the experience, while conveying a sense of material immersion in a vibrantly agentic 
world and encouraging the notion of a subjectivity emerging “hazardously and 
ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social processes” (Coole and Frost 10), 
also pushes at the boundaries of the posthumanist/material ecocritical paradigm by 
signalling the necessity for an ongoing investigation of the specificity of the human 
animal and highlighting the role of affect in bringing ethical concerns to the fore. 
 
Part II: W. G. Sebald’s Orford Ness and the ‘Traces of Destruction’ 
 
The Rings of Saturn, subtitled in the original German-language edition An English 
Pilgrimage, documents a journey on foot through the East of England, with a narrative 
delivered by a semi-fictionalised narrator-figure. It was first published in Germany in 
1995, with the English translation by Michael Hulse coming out in 1998. Like the 
Thoreauvian saunterer or the walkers of narrative scholarship, the narrator of the book 
views his walking tour as holding the promise of psychic restoration. He begins: “In 
August 1992, when the dog days were drawing to an end, I set off to walk the county of 
Suffolk, in the hope of dispelling the emptiness that takes hold of me whenever I have 
completed a long stint of work” (3). However, even in the course of the very first 
paragraph those expectations are quashed and we are given a sense of misalignment 
and discord. Though at first he feels carefree as he moves through the landscape, the 
narrator almost immediately finds his joyful spirit dissipating: “At all events, in 
retrospect I became preoccupied not only with the unaccustomed sense of freedom but 
also with the paralysing horror that had come over me at various times when 
confronted with the traces of destruction, reaching far back into the past, that were 
evident even in that remote place” (3). In fact, a year to the day after beginning this 
walking tour, the narrator/Sebald (it is difficult to distinguish with any certainty 
between the two) is hospitalised, immobilised by his reaction to that horror. And 
nowhere are those ‘traces of destruction’ more evident than when he reaches the 
‘almost-island’ of Orford Ness, an episode he describes briefly towards the end of the 
book.  
Orford Ness is a shingle spit joined to the English Suffolk coast at Aldeburgh, but 
then separated from the mainland by the river Alde as it makes its way to the sea. For 
much of the 20th century the Ness was a site for secret military research, including the 
development and testing of atomic weapons. Though it is now owned by the National 
Trust and is open to visitors, the area is still littered with the remnants of its military 
history, including strange earth mounds, and buildings known, because of their uncanny 
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resemblance to the religious buildings of Eastern Asia, as the ‘pagodas’. It is a place 
which seems to hold a particular fascination for Sebald, a fascination located at least in 
part in the geological genesis of the island; it has an “extra-territorial quality” (233), 
perhaps generated by the way in which it has been gradually shape-shifting over a 
period of millennia, moving “down from the north across the mouth of the River Alde, in 
such a way that the tidal lower reaches, known as the Ore, run for some twelve miles just 
inside the present coastline before flowing into the sea” (233). 
It is perhaps this extra-territorial quality, and the sense that it is a landmass 
constantly in (slow) motion, which set the scene for the intense experience of 
dislocation and disorientation which follows. The state of the narrator as he steps onto 
the island is one of utter blankness: “I had not a single thought in my head. With each 
step that I took, the emptiness within and the emptiness without grew ever greater and 
the silence more profound” (234). However, when he startles a hare hiding in the grass 
beside him the episode remains etched into his mind, a moment in which animal and 
human become disorientatingly indistinguishable: 
I still see what occurred in that one tremulous instant with an undiminished clarity. I see 
the edge of the grey tarmac and every individual blade of grass, I see the hare leaping out 
of its hiding-place, with its ears laid back and a curiously human expression on its face 
that was rigid with terror and strangely divided; and in its eyes, turning to look back as it 
fled and almost popping out of its head with fright, I see myself, become one with it. (235)  
 
The mounds and pagodas have a similarly disorientating effect. At first they suggest to 
the narrator pre-historic burials or some ancient religious function, but soon develop for 
him into “the image of the remains of our civilization after its extinction in some future 
catastrophe” (237), and lead him to imagine the landscape being walked by a future 
visitor for whom, as for the narrator, the nature of the long-departed inhabitants of the 
place is a mystery: 
To me too, as for some latter-day stranger ignorant of the nature of our society 
wandering about among heaps of scrap metal and defunct machinery, the beings who had 
once lived and worked here were an enigma, as was the purpose of the primitive 
contraptions and fittings inside the bunkers, the iron rails under the ceilings, the hooks 
on the still partially tiled walls, the showerheads the size of plates, the ramps and the 
soakaways. (237)  
 
This sense of temporal dislocation and inability to fathom the nature of the beings 
responsible for the scraps of metal and defunct machinery leaves the narrator utterly 
disorientated: “Where and in what time I was that day at Orford Ness I cannot say” 
(237). As he watches the sun set, the tide advancing up the river, and listens to the 
“scarcely audible hum” (237) of the radio masts above the marshes, he feels utterly 
displaced. Unlike Thoreau’s saunterers who are at home everywhere, the narrator of The 
Rings of Saturn finds that he is no longer at home anywhere. Looking back at the town of 
Orford he thinks, “There […] I was once at home” (237).   
The Orford Ness passage as a whole, and this collection of ‘things’ in particular, 
holds elements that might be seen to speak to several of the new materialist, 
posthumanist and material ecocritical concepts discussed above. It is brimming with the 
kind of vibrant materiality Jane Bennett evokes in her description of the things she finds 
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in the Baltimore storm-drain, each element, including every individual blade of grass, 
manifesting the ability to command attention. The fraught encounter with the hare gives 
a sense of the blurring of boundaries between human and animal, conjuring a kind of 
human/nonhuman kinship, and at the same time suggesting the existence of nonhuman 
subjectivities in the landscape. The collection of ‘things’ Sebald details—particularly the 
scrap metal and the bewildering contraptions at the centre of the description—is also 
foregrounded in the text to imply some kind of ongoing vitality and significance. The 
human, the hare, the tarmac, the grass, the decaying buildings and their fittings, the 
setting sun, the rising tide, and the humming radio mast together comprise a powerful 
assemblage involving a host of different processes of becoming. But their treatment in 
the text also pushes at the boundaries of a materialist reading that stops short of 
addressing the affective dimension of their vitality. The passage clearly chimes with 
some of the accounts of affect given by Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth. The 
whole episode is replete with a sense of “intensities that pass body to body (human, 
nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate about, 
between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds” (Gregg and Seigworth 1). The sense 
of kinship between the human and the hare rests above all in a kind of trans-corporeal 
affect as they mirror each other’s terror and disorientation in an affective intensity that 
registers viscerally and circulates between the two bodies. When it comes to the 
collective agencies of the assemblage, Sebald’s text shows their affective impact 
developing incrementally and swarming within the narrator’s mind, exceeding the 
context of their emergence and involving him in imaginative processes that range across 
past and future timescales. What is perhaps most striking about the scene is the affective 
power of the material objects to conjure, as they intra-act with the sensorium of the 
human animal, a sense of phenomena that are not actually present, calling up from the 
unconscious fragments of historical memory and potentially calling forth feelings of guilt 
and shame. This affective power works “beneath, alongside, or generally other than 
conscious knowing” (Gregg and Seigworth 1). On my first reading of the Orford Ness 
passage, the “primitive contraptions and fittings inside the bunkers, the iron rails under 
the ceilings, the hooks on the still partially tiled walls, the showerheads the size of 
plates, the ramps and the soakaways” (237) inexorably conjured images of the 
Holocaust in my mind, just as I believe they did for Sebald—an affective impact he 
conveys subtly through the narrator’s account of his Orford Ness experience.  
This idea of an affective force that exceeds its initial context is one that comes 
into play in Sebald’s own account of his writing. In the radio interview mentioned in the 
prelude to this essay, the host Michael Silverblatt questioned him about certain themes 
in his writing that are never made explicit yet are powerfully present. He says of 
Sebald’s later work Austerlitz that the text seems to have an “invisible referent”, and 
that, as the narrative progresses, “the missing term is the concentration camp, and that 
always circling is this silent presence being left out but always gestured toward. Is that 
correct?” (“Interview” n.p.). Sebald responds in the affirmative, elaborating, “I’ve always 
felt that it was necessary above all to write about the history of persecution, of 
vilification of minorities, the attempt well-nigh achieved to eradicate a whole people” 
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but suggesting that the horror of this subject is so great that it can only be approached 
tangentially. Nevertheless “you need to find ways of convincing the reader that this is 
something that is on your mind […]. The reader needs to be prompted that the narrator 
has a conscience”. Sebald describes this invisible referent as an “undeclared concern,” 
giving as a further example a piece of writing by Virginia Woolf, ostensibly about the 
death of a moth on a window pane in Sussex, but which actually evokes the writer’s 
concerns about the battles of the First World War. The passage, Sebald suggests, 
demonstrates that Woolf “was greatly perturbed by the first world war and by its 
aftermath, by the damage it did to peoples’ souls” (“Interview” n.p.). 
One of the undeclared concerns in the Orford Ness passage certainly seems to be 
the concentration camp, and, more broadly the damage done to human souls by war. But 
while Sebald might, as a writer, be deliberately trying to provoke an affective response 
in the reader by hinting at these concerns, the phenomena that drive this impulse and 
bring these concerns to his mind are the material ‘traces of destruction’ he finds in the 
landscape. He does not seem to be suggesting that humanity is the real agent in the 
Orford Ness assemblage, nor does he promote the idea of the kind of self-reflexive, 
invariant human self. The narrator is very much acted upon as vital matter and by vital 
matter, with an identity that seems uncertain and contingent throughout—one that is 
initially blank, almost waiting to be co-created through intra-action with its 
environment.  Mark McCulloh suggests that Sebald’s world view is a kind of monism: 
"Everything—body and soul, mind and matter, present and past—belongs to one 
continuum" (20). This has much in common with Bennett’s onto-tale of matter, but it is 
one that allows for the “subjective and intersubjective connotations, memories, and 
affects” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 10) that Bennett identifies as a function of vital 
materiality but chooses not to explore further. The power of the Orford Ness assemblage 
for Sebald, and for a reader alert to its undeclared concern, lies not only in its vitality as 
a collection of things with ongoing material effects in the environment but in an affective 
force which builds incrementally through the continuum of body/soul, mind/matter, 
present/past, powerfully raising questions of ‘conscience’. This mention of conscience, 
of course, leads us back to expressly human concepts and concerns. However it does not 
seem to be motivated by a desire to exalt the human soul, but rather to put it under close 
scrutiny. The narrator’s palpable inability to comprehend the ‘beings’ with their 
‘primitive contraptions’ who lived and worked at Orford Ness, and his feeling of extreme 
temporal distance from them (when in fact less than a decade had passed between the 
departure of the last service personnel2 and the publication of The Rings of Saturn) 
suggest that Sebald might side with Levinas in believing that humanism is not yet 
‘sufficiently human’. It can also be seen as signalling a need to investigate the human 
dimension of material affect, particularly since it seems to be here that considerations of 
responsibility and ethics arise.  
Sebald has already been identified as a writer who is “informed by a profound 
ethical and political seriousness” (Long and Whitehead 4), and I would argue that the 
                                                     
2 According to the National Trust website page for Orford Ness, the last military service personnel left Orford 
Ness in 1987. 
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Orford Ness passage, through its complex and subtle engagement with the landscape’s 
affective powers offers a greater potential for the consideration of “how we wish to live” 
(Probyn 89) than an approach more focused on material effect. In order to demonstrate 
this greater potential I look now at the 2013 “Episode 7” of the British wildlife 
documentary programme, Springwatch, set on Orford Ness. The tenor of the narrative is 
a celebration the re-encroachment of ‘nature’ on the site, and it exemplifies to me the 
danger of any version of events that forgets its human history and that embraces 
material vitality without deep reflection about the implications of the contribution of the 
human animal to that vitalism. The military history of the Ness is outlined, with the 
presenter talking of its involvement in design and engineering, and of the nuclear bombs 
“that were born here” but whose threat has now dissipated: “Tested, stressed, pushed 
and pounded, designing the end of the world—now they’ve gone. The buildings fade into 
the land, replaced by nature and its accidental designs of evolution”. The narrative 
clearly expresses a sense of ongoing material processes but it also displays an almost 
wilful neutralisation of human responsibility. The idea of bombs being ‘born’ on the site 
has the effect of naturalising their existence. The description concludes: 
so many new and different lives in a landscape that plotted to take life away. Just as 
nature is rising here so the buildings of Orford Ness are falling […] leaving a question for 
our nation. Renovate this unique landscape - an emblem of British design - or forget it? 
Allow continued ruination, a redesign by nature.  
 
The complacency of this statement and the manipulation of its grammatical subject 
speak volumes. The landscape plotted to take life away, but the apocalypse never 
happened and so the necessity of exploring the species that actually made the plans for 
the end of the world has dissipated. The sinister buildings and contraptions of Sebald’s 
Ness are neutralised, either to be renovated as (apparently) positive emblem of design, 
or left to material processes of decay. 
To some this optimism may seem a positive development, particularly in the 
context of environmentalism, which sometimes suffers from an almost crippling sense of 
doom. Timothy Morton states:  
Environmentalism is often apocalyptic. It warns of, and wards off, the end of the world. 
[…]But things aren’t like that: the end of the world has already happened. We sprayed the 
DDT. We exploded the nuclear bombs. We changed the climate. This is what it looks like 
after the end of the world. Today is not the end of history. We’re living at the beginning of 
history. (98) 
 
For Morton, the end of the world has already happened and we must think forward from 
this point. For Sebald, past and future co-exist—his monism encapsulates them. We live 
in the midst of the flow of history backwards and forwards, and the potential 
apocalypse—the ‘future catastrophe’—symbolised by the contraptions at Orford Ness 
resides within us at all times. Standing in stark contrast to the blithe optimism of 
Springwatch are the figures cited by Stuart Parkinson, the executive director of 
Scientists for Global Responsibility, in a recent blog entry. According to Parkinson, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change calculates recent global spending on 
climate change mitigation and adaptations at 364 billion US dollars. By contrast the 
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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) figure for global military 
spending in 2013 is an astonishing 1.75 trillion US dollars. The figures suggest that we 
are still, in various ways, designing the end of the world. In this context it seems that 
Sebald’s preoccupation with affect, memory and ethics is well-founded. For a species 
that can carry out the “attempt well-nigh achieved to eradicate a whole people” or wage 
war on a ‘world’ scale, the domination of nature even to the brink of ecocide and beyond 
is entirely possible. It suggests that a remorseless enquiry into the specificity of such a 
species and an investigation of the means by which ethical changes might be triggered is 
highly necessary in the context of ecological and environmental thought. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Sebald ends The Rings of Saturn with a powerful evocation of mortality and loss. 
He says that in the Holland of Sir Thomas Browne’s time  
it was customary, in a home where there had been a death, to drape black mourning 
ribbons over all the mirrors and all canvasses depicting landscapes or people or the fruits 
of the field, so that the soul, as it left the body, would not be distracted on its final journey, 
either by a reflection of itself or by a last glimpse of the land now being lost for ever. 
(296) 
 
A world in which humanity discards its history along with the bad draft of humanness 
will endlessly be lost to us spiritually and perhaps also ecologically. In conclusion, I 
return to the song with which I began the essay and its assertion that we are a “very 
special breed”. The insights of the new materialisms and posthumanism have shown us 
to be a materially less discrete, and certainly less ‘special’ breed. However, we are the 
only breed to have used its technicity to ‘design the end of the world’, and perhaps the 
only one to have attempted to eradicate a whole racial component of our species. While 
quite rightly removing us from the privileged place we have appropriated for ourselves 
in the mesh of being, posthumanism cannot yet afford to drape black ribbons over all the 
mirrors which might reflect us back to ourselves and which give the human soul a 
glimpse of the land we run the risk of losing for ever. Timothy Morton, argues that in 
developing ecological thinking we should continue to allow “a special place for the 
‘subject’ — the mind, the person, even the soul” (113). Ecocriticism needs to continue to 
puzzle over those enigmatic beings who constructed the mysterious buildings in 
Sebald’s assemblage, and to reserve a place in its theorisations for affect, human 
subjectivity, and even the troubled human soul, particularly when it comes to the 
question of developing new ethical positions. Sebald, or at least his narrator figure, 
might be overcome by paralysing horror at the traces of destruction in the landscape, 
might, as Gregg and Seigworth suggest, be “overwhelmed by the world’s apparent 
intractability” (1), however, his exploration of material affect, at the very least, raises 
important ethical questions about how we might wish to live. 
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